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Introduction
In this paper we examine which political and economic factors affect the likelihood that a central bank governor will be replaced. We present new data on the term in office of central bank governors for 137 countries covering the period 1970-2004, thereby substantially extending previous datasets, both regarding the number of countries and the number of years covered. 1 We estimate conditional Logit models of the probability that the central bank governor will be replaced. Our results show that the share of the current term in office elapsed, high levels of political and regime instability, the occurrence of elections, and inflation increase the probability of a turnover.
Our main contribution is that we criticize the use of the so-called turnover rate of central bank governors (TOR) as an indicator of central bank independence (CBI).
2
To examine whether there is any relationship between CBI and inflation, one needs an indicator measuring the extent to which the monetary authorities are independent from politicians. Most empirical studies use an indicator based on central bank laws in place. However, legal measures of CBI may not reflect the true relationship between the central bank and the government (Forder, 1996 and Mangano, 1998) . Especially in countries where the rule of law is less strongly embedded in the political culture, there can be wide gaps between the formal, legal institutional arrangements and their practical impact (Walsh, 2005) . This is particularly likely in many developing economies. Cukierman (1992) argues that the TOR may therefore be a better proxy for CBI in these countries than measures based on central bank laws. The TOR is based on the presumption that, at least above some threshold, a higher turnover of central bank governors indicates a lower level of independence. Various studies report that countries that experienced rapid turnover among their central bank heads also tended to experience high rates of inflation (see, for instance, Cukierman, 1992) . This is a case, however, in which causality is difficult to evaluate; is inflation high because of political interference that leads to rapid turnover of central bank officials? Or are central bank officials tossed out because they can't keep inflation down? (Walsh, 2005) . In the latter case, the TOR is a poor indicator of CBI.
The datasets of Cukierman (1992) and Kooi (2000) are the most widely used previous datasets.
2 See Berger et al. (2001) for a survey of the literature on central bank independence. 3 A few studies have sounded a warning that conclusions on the relationship between inflation and the TOR are highly sensitive to influential observations. De Haan and Kooi (2000) and Sturm and De Haan (2001) report that the TOR indicator only becomes significant if high inflation countries are added to the sample. This suggests that causality may run from inflation to turnovers rather than the other way round.
3
Our empirical results suggest that using the TOR as a proxy for CBI is problematic when it comes to measuring the impact of central bank independence on inflation. Since inflation increases the likelihood that the central bank governor will be replaced, turnovers are endogenous to inflation. This is confirmed in models for cross-section inflation differentials in which the TOR becomes insignificant once its endogeneity is taken into account.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes our data and section 3 discusses the methodology used. Section 4 presents our estimation results for the likelihood that a central bank governor will be replaced, while section 5 contains the models for cross-section inflation. The final section offers some concluding comments.
Data
The database contains information on the term in office of the central bank governor Our dataset also includes information on the legal term in office of the central bank governor. Unfortunately, data is not available for all country-years in our sample. We obtained data on regular office terms for 91 countries, for an average of 31 years, ranging from 8-36. In some cases the governor's term in office is unlimited, and the most likely reason for a turnover is retirement due to age.
Methodology
According to Cukierman (1992) , high and sustained inflation leads to the evolution of automatic or semi-automatic accommodative mechanisms, like indexation of contracts in the labour and capital markets, that may undermine central bank independence.
Alternatively, it may be argued that a high inflation rate may cause the replacement of the central bank governor due to dissatisfaction with this policy outcome (Walsh, 2005) .
Both arguments, although fundamentally different in their reasoning, lead to the hypothesis that the higher the rate of inflation the shorter the term in office of the governor will be. We test this hypothesis using our new dataset.
We first estimate a model for the likelihood that a central bank governor is being replaced. Our dependent variable is binary, and takes the value one if the central bank governor was replaced in a particular year and country. We estimate our model employing conditional fixed effects Logit. In case of binary choice variables with panel data we observe:
where:
. This function can be interpreted as the inclination of the government to replace the central bank governor, which is dependent on observed variables (x), unobserved individual (country) characteristics (α) and a random error term (ν). The probability that we observe a replacement is:
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In a fixed effects context, the number of parameters increases with the number of countries. This is known as the incidental parameters problem. Chamberlain (1980) shows that it is impossible to estimate the parameters of this binary choice model consistently and he therefore proposes a method to circumvent this problem, i.e.
conditional Logit estimation. The idea of this approach is to condition the likelihood function on a minimal sufficient statistic for the fixed effects. Chamberlain argues that
is such a minimum sufficient statistic. The conditional likelihood function can now be written as:
The probability of the observed replacement of the central bank governor (by construction) no longer depends on the fixed effects and hence the coefficients of the variables of interest can be estimated consistently. In essence, the conditional fixed effects Logit estimator compares all observations within a given country when there is a replacement of the central bank governor with all the observations when there is no such change.
5
Since some of the data are not available for all country-years, the panel data are unbalanced. All explanatory economic variables are lagged by one year to avoid simultaneity. The explanatory variable of prime interest, i.e. the inflation rate p, is transformed by the formula (p/100)/(1+(p/100)= π) to reduce the influence of extreme observations. The estimated model is:
where govchange is one in year t when at least one change of the central bank governor occurred in that year; shelap is the share of the governor's legal term in office elapsed, and X is a vector of control variables. η i are the country dummies and u it is an i.i.d.
disturbance.
9
We include the share of the governors' term in office as stipulated by the central bank law that has elapsed. For instance, if the legal term in office is 8 years, and the governor has been in office for 4 years this variable is 0.5. However, in case of an indefinite or unknown term in office it is not obvious how to construct this variable. In those cases we presume that the maximum legal term in office is 8 years.
6
To determine which control variables should be taken up, we have screened the literature to come up with a long list of potential control variables. 7 The variables are listed in Table A2 in the Appendix. We apply a general to specific approach to come up with our base model. Finally, we employ the so-called Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA) to examine the robustness of our findings. This approach can be explained as follows. We estimate equations of the following general form:
where M is a vector of 'standard' explanatory variables; F is the variable of interest (in our case: recent inflation); Z is a vector of up to three (here we follow Levine and Renelt, 1992) We have also experimented with two alternatives. First, we assumed the term in office for countries with indefinite or unknown term in office to be equal to the average time in office in our sample, i.e. 3.6 years. Second, we took the average of those countries that have specified the term in office of the CB governor in their central bank law (5 years). It turned out that our main results are very similar under both alternatives (results available on request). 7 Those few studies that explicitly estimate models explaining cross-country variation in CBI suggest various control variables. A good example is Stasavage and Keefer (2003) who argue that political replacement of a central bank governor is more likely in the presence of multiple political veto players; to take this argument into account we employ Henisz's (2000) data on political constraints. Frankel (2005) reports that in the year following a currency crash the finance minister or central bank governor -whoever held the office of the country's governor of the IMF -often lost his job. To take this argument into account, we employ a dummy variable reflecting the occurrence of a currency crisis. A very detailed motivation and description of the control variables is provided in Dreher et al. (2007) . In the final part of our analysis we estimate panel and cross-section models for inflation using a model similar to that of Campillo and Miron (1997) . The models are first estimated by OLS, assuming that the TOR is exogenous. Next, we take the endogeneity of the TOR into account, using the results of our conditional fixed effects Logit model for the likelihood that a central bank governor is being replaced. Table 1 shows the estimation results for equation (4). The specification is chosen on the basis of a general to specific approach applied to various possible control variables -shown in Table A2 of the Appendix -that all have been suggested to affect the term in office of central bank governors (see Dreher et al. 2007 for an extensive discussion). The estimation results suggest that five variables are significant determinants of the likelihood that a central bank governor will be replaced: the share of the legal term in office that has elapsed, the share of political veto players who drop, a post-election variable measuring the part of a year which is within 12 months after an election, a dummy for coups d'etats, and -most important for our analysis -(lagged) inflation.
Results for the logit model
Past inflation increases the probability that the central bank governor will be replaced at the five percent level of significance. According to the marginal effect, a percentage point increase in inflation increases the probability of a turnover by 21 percent.
specifications are estimated (by OLS) to check the sensitivity of the coefficient estimate of the variable of interest. The biggest disadvantages of the BACE approach are the need of having a balanced data set, i.e. an equal number of observations for all regressions (due to the chosen weighting scheme) and the restriction of limiting the list of potential variables to be less than the number of observations. Table 2 shows the outcome of the EBA. We have employed two specifications for the M-vector. In the restricted model, only the share of the legal term if office that has elapsed is included in the M-vector, while the remaining variables listed in Table A2 in the Appendix are included in the Z-vector. In the full model, all variables arising from the general-to-specific approach as shown in Table 1 are taken up in the M vector, while the remaining variables are in the Z-vector. As can be seen, according to both specifications, the CDF(0) test indicates that inflation is robustly related to the likelihood that the central bank governor will be replaced. Now that we have shown that inflation has a robust impact on the likelihood that a central bank governor will be replaced, we will examine in the next section the implications of this finding for models explaining cross-country inflation differentials using the TOR as a procy for CBI.
Inflation models
In this section we report panel and cross-section models for inflation. The dependent variable is our transformed inflation variable. Following Campillo and Miron (1997),
we include the following explanatory variables:
• An indicator for openness (OPEN, defined as sum of export and import in relation to GDP) over the period under consideration (taken from the World Bank's World Development Indicators).
• The log of the level of GDP per capita (GDPCAP) at the beginning of the period (again from the World Development Indicators).
• A proxy for political instability (PI), measured by the first principal component of the number of assassinations, strikes, guerrilla warfare, major crises, riots, and revolutions in a particular country and year taken from the Databanks International (2005) Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive.
• An exchange rate dummy, which is one if the country's exchange rate is classified as fixed according to the de-facto classification of exchange rate regimes in Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) , and zero otherwise. This variable is used to examine the impact of the exchange rate regime and is denoted as XRATE.
As it is well-known that the TOR may not be a good indicator of CBI in industrial countries (Cukierman, 1992) , we not only include the TOR in the model, but also its interaction with a dummy that is one if the country concerned is an OECD country and zero otherwise.
The first column of Table 3 shows the results for a panel, using the averages or starting values of the variables for the periods 1970-79, 1980-89 and 1990-2004 . In line with most previous studies, the coefficient of the TOR is positive and highly significant. run from inflation to turnovers rather than the other way round. Therefore, we next treat 13 the TOR as an endogenous variable using the variables that we found to be significant determinants of the likelihood that a central bank governor will be replaced as instruments. F-tests on the joint significance of our instruments (the average share of the legal term in office that has elapsed, percentage of veto players who drop, elections, and number of coups) in the first-stage regressions show that they are good predictors of turnovers, conditional on the full set of exogenous variables in the system. As the Ftests reported in Table 3 indicate, the Staiger-Stock critical value of 10 is easily passed in all regressions. In all regressions, the overidentifying restrictions are also accepted at the five percent level of significance at least.
The results are shown in column (2) of Table 3 . It turns out that the TOR no longer has a significant impact on inflation. The same conclusion is reached for the cross-section models shown in columns (3) - (8) of Table 3 . If the TOR is used in the OLS regression, its coefficient is generally significantly different from zero. However, in the 2SLS models, the TOR never has a significant impact on inflation. Inflation: cross-country and panel models, 1970-2004 (1) 
